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Can Corporate Management Substitute for Legal Institutions? 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Multinationals are increasingly conducting R&D in countries such as India and 
China, where intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is still very weak.  This 
paper examines this puzzle.  The argument is that weak IPR leads to low returns 
to innovation and thus low prices of innovative talents.  Multinational firms who 
possess not only the capabilities to utilize these talents, but also the internal 
organizational structures to protect the intellectual properties will therefore find it 
attractive to conduct R&D at those locations.  Following a series of interviews in 
major multinational R&D centers in China, a stylized model of the above is 
presented to capture the interaction between firm strategies and institutional 
environment.  Empirical findings from a sample of 1567 US-headquartered 
innovating firms are consistent with the hypotheses that (i) technologies 
developed in weak IPR countries are used more internally, and (ii) firms doing 
R&D in weak IPR countries have tighter internal technology structures.  The 
results suggest that firms are using strong internal linkages to substitute for the 
inadequate external institutions.  And by doing so, they can take advantage of the 
arbitrage opportunities presented by the institutional gaps across countries. 
 
 
Keywords:    R&D, intellectual property rights, multinational firms, arbitrage 
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Intellectual property is still an extremely vague concept in China, 
where fake DVDs are sold on street corners and even the Government 
uses pirated software.  
 –– The Times (London), Dec. 12, 2002 
A significant number of multinationals are increasingly combing the 
mainland (China) for engineers and researchers to handle projects for 
global applications that, in recent years, would have been performed 
in labs in the United States or Europe. 
 –– ZDNet News, Jul. 10, 2002 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent years have witnessed a surge of multinational R&D activity in countries such 
as India and China, where the intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is still far from 
satisfactory.  Technology giants Microsoft, IBM, Intel, and General Electric are in the 
lead, but more firms are following. (Financial Times 4/19/02; New York Times 4/21/02; 
ZDNet News 6/10/02; BusinessWeek 2/03/03; Wall Street Journal 7/14/03)  Moreover, 
the R&D conducted in these Indian and Chinese labs is in excess of that required for 
product localization or government-enforced technology transfers. 
This trend is in apparent contradiction of conventional wisdom.  Because poor 
institutional environment erodes the appropriable value of innovation, firms have been 
advised to keep their knowledge-intensive activities away from weak IPR countries.  
What has enabled some firms to act differently?  
To understand this puzzle, I began with a series of interviews in the multinational R&D 
labs in China.  Some common practices emerged: intensive interactions with headquarters, 
patents application in the home country, and internal project transfers across countries.  
In particular, the projects are often closely integrated in the multinational firms’ global 
research agendas.  The “carved-out expertise” – as called by some labs – is valuable only 
when combined with the complementary knowledge and resources within the firm.  Even 
if imitation occurs, the value that can be taken away from the firm is very limited.  The 
closely-knit internal innovation structure, therefore, serves as an immune system against 
the adverse external environment.   
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This observation suggests a framework to examine the original puzzle.  In countries with 
poor IPR protection and poor institutional environment overall, local firms cannot 
appropriate value from their intellectual products.  As a result, R&D is discouraged and 
human capital is undervalued.  This is in spite of the fact that these countries have a large 
pool of potentially valuable talents to conduct R&D.  Multinationals are in a unique 
position to arbitrage the difference in factor prices across national borders; their ability to 
do so stems from their internal organizations that can be viewed as a substitute for the 
inadequate external institutions.  I call it the internalization-arbitrage conjecture.  
To articulate the idea in a logically traceable way, a stylized model of the above is 
presented.  It shows that multinationals may find it desirable to conduct R&D across 
borders when technologies are complementary internally.  By keeping the 
complementary resources well protected, multinationals are able to leverage the strong 
institutions in the home country for their operations overseas.  The viability of this 
strategy depends on a set of firm-specific and knowledge-specific characteristics.   
The study then seeks empirical evidence of the theoretical conjecture, using US patent 
data and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations.  I find supportive results that 
technologies developed in weak IPR countries are used more internally than those 
developed in other foreign countries.  In addition, firms doing R&D in weak IPR 
countries feature significantly stronger internal linkages than those staying out.  The 
results are consistent with the thought that the internal linkages allow firms to appropriate 
value from their knowledge even under weak institutional environment.  
The following section briefly describes the interviews in China.  Section III presents a 
simple model to show how arbitrage opportunities can emerge from the interaction 
between firms and institutions.  Section IV brings the theoretical conjecture to the data 
and sets up the framework for empirical analysis.  The results are analyzed in Section V.  
Potential caveats and robustness checks are discussed in Section VI.  Section VII 
concludes and discusses future extensions. 
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II.  THE CHINA STORY 
 
Chinese colleges and universities are churning out nearly half a million science and 
engineering degrees every year, almost the same size as in the United States.  However, 
domestic R&D investment remains at a very low level; the still weak enforcement of IPR 
protection is often to blame.   
In contrast, multinationals are streaming into China to tap the best talents in the country.  
By the end of 2002, over four hundred foreign owned R&D centers have been 
established, hiring away the best masters and Ph.D.s from China’s top universities and 
research institutes.  What enable the multinationals to do something that the locals are not 
able to do?  With this puzzle on mind, I conducted a series of interviews with researchers 
and managers in some major multinational R&D labs in Beijing and Shanghai in the 
summer of 2002.1  The observations suggest a key role of firms’ internal organizations. 
2.1  Organizational Structure 
To utilize the human capital and appropriate value from the R&D projects in China, 
multinationals have to keep the knowledge leakage at the lowest level possible.  At the 
same time, China has a booming domestic market.  Competition for market shares 
requires that multinationals effectively transfer and adapt technologies for their local 
operations.  This dilemma leads to a common practice among multinational firms in 
China: the separation of localization-oriented R&D centers and research labs that aim to 
develop frontier technologies for global applications. 
During the interviews, it was repeatedly emphasized to me that the research labs are a 
coherent part of the firms’ worldwide R&D forces.  For example, the goal of Microsoft 
Research (MSR) Asia in Beijing is to “attract the most talented researchers in the field of 
computing” and to “advance the state-of-the-art in computer science research”.  The 
mission of IBM China Research Lab (CRL) is to “create world-class information 
technologies and the underlying science which propel the world advances”.  Intel China 
                                                 
1  Seven of the labs belong to Global 500 companies, and six have more than 100 researchers employed.  
Information has been updated through emails and phone calls during the year. 
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Software Lab (ICSL) hopes to “create and enhance global value of Intel's silicon, 
platforms and solutions by delivering innovative software technology and quality 
products”. 
With such missions, a research lab is usually a parallel organization outside of the 
multinational’s local operations.  It reports directly to the technology department at 
headquarters, connected with the firm’s other labs by intranet, conference calls, regular 
meetings, and project collaborations.  Because the resultant technologies are aimed at 
global applications, intellectual property issues are mostly handled in the home country. 
The centralized organization of these research labs facilitates the transfer of research 
projects across locations, and thus makes it possible to exercise the strategy of 
differentiated project assignment.  Not only do the labs conduct very specific types of 
R&D, but also R&D projects at specific stages.  For example, once a project gets close to 
commercialization, it may be considered “too risky” to stay in China.  The firm will 
either intensify the monitoring or transfer the project to other locations.  In other words, 
with the tight internal organization of R&D activities, the firm can make sure that the 
R&D activities in China do not expose too much value to risk.  
2.2  The Internal Linkages 
Unlike those in the localization-oriented R&D centers, people in the research labs do not 
seem to be very concerned about imitation risks.  When I asked the question: “Given the 
weak IPR protection in China, are you concerned that your technology would soon be 
stolen?” there are mainly two types of responses: 
First, “they don’t have the ability to steal.”  Researchers believe that the projects in their 
labs draw heavily on the firm-specific expertise, a resource that can only accumulate over 
time inside the firm.  For instance, the “Personalized Cartoon Generation and Animation” 
project in MSR Asia, which later forms the basis of the newest MSN Messenger package, 
is a frontier technology building on Microsoft’s strength in computer vision and computer 
graphics.   In the Intel lab, most efforts are on developing new BIOS, compilers, and 
device drivers for Intel architecture platforms.  “They are built on Intel technology, and 
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they are part of Intel technology,” a team leader said, “Imitation? Not an easy task, 
especially if the imitators don’t have the same exposure.” 
It is true that copycats do not have to understand the technology before they make copies 
of the final products.  But very few final products are developed in these Beijing or 
Shanghai labs.  The research results will be integrated into the final applications 
somewhere else, most likely at headquarters.  What can be taken away from the research 
labs are abstract algorithms, theoretical development, and experiment reports. 
Hence there came the second type of answers: “why would they steal?”  Intel BOIS, of 
course, can only be used on Intel chips.  A major success of MSR Asia in 2002 was 
“AutoMovie”, a technology that can intelligently generate edited movies from home 
videos.  It is later integrated in “Microsoft Movie Maker”, which is distributed with the 
new Windows operating systems.  Similar examples are the “Mobile HTML Optimizer” 
used in Microsoft FrontPage, the “Ink Parsing” technology used in Tablet PC, and the 
“error-resilient video transmission” technology used in the MPEG4 Standard.  These are 
all considered major contributions in the field, but they themselves do not bring direct 
commercial value to potential imitators.  “We don’t count on the legal system for 
protection; we count on the technologies to protect themselves,” a researcher told me. 
In sum, if technologies inside the firm are highly complementary, the leakage of a 
particular technology will not significantly affect firm value.  The two types of answers 
described above suggest two potential sources of internal complementarity: 
 Because the generation of these technologies relies heavily on the firms’ internal 
expertise, imitation is difficult without the context.   
 Because the appropriation of these technologies needs the integration with other 
internal knowledge and resources, the individual technologies do not bring direct 
value to the imitators. 
2.3  The Time Trend 
Why is this kind of R&D arrangement such a recent phenomenon?  First, China –– like 
some other weak IPR countries –– has just opened its door to foreign investors.  Even 
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after the opening up, for a long time the government required minimum local stakes in 
foreign invested enterprises, which made close integration almost impossible.  In fact, 
nearly all these research labs were established after restrictions on wholly owned 
subsidiaries were removed. 
Another important driving force is the development of information technologies, which 
has dramatically reduced the cost of international coordination.  Firms need highly 
intensive communications to make sure that the components developed in China fit 
seamlessly to the needs at the firm level.  The efforts have been greatly facilitated by 
Internet and the improvement in the local IT infrastructure. 
Multinational firms also gained more experience in organizing large-scale R&D projects 
and in dealing with the institutional idiosyncrasy in China.  “Multinationals are gradually 
learning how to move smartly, and some learned their lessons in the hard way,” a 
researcher said when referring to the firm’s earlier loss from counterfeits. 
 
 
III.  THE MODEL 
 
The interviews suggest that firms may be able to use their internal organizations to 
protect knowledge, hence taking advantage of the inexpensive human capital in weak IPR 
countries.  In this section I present a simple model to show how technology 
complementarities, firm organizations, and legal institutions interact with one another.  
This model serves two purposes: to help me study the cross-border arbitrage in a more 
structured manner, and to motivate the empirical study in the next section. 
3.1  The Nature of Knowledge Diffusion 
There are three critical steps in imitation: the motivation to imitate, the ability to imitate, 
and the possibility of getting around the legal restrictions against imitation.  In an 
institutional environment where the legal restrictions barely exist or are not effectively 
enforced, the first two factors can play a critical role in firms’ IPR protection.  They both 
stem from the very nature of knowledge flows.   
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First, the motivation to imitate is low when technologies are highly dependent on internal 
resources.  Imitation is costly (Mansfield et.al. 1981), so it will only happen when 
imitators can profit from the technologies.  Teece (1986) points out that specialized and 
co-specialized complementary assets are critically important to the successful 
commercialization of an innovation.  Thus, innovators can discourage imitation by 
developing technologies that require complementary knowledge not readily available to 
potential imitators.  For example, basic research that is still far from commercialization, 
or technologies that are highly firm specific, are usually less attractive to imitators who 
lack the resources to utilize the knowledge.   
Second, the acquisition of complementary knowledge is subject to the constraints of 
absorptive capacity and geographic distance.  It has long been realized that a 
multinational corporation is a geographically distributed innovation network, with the 
capacity to assimilate, generate and integrate knowledge on a worldwide basis (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1990).  Knowledge that is difficult to codify or teach can be more 
efficiently transferred within the firm (Kogut and Zander, 1993).  Therefore, outside 
firms have to face much higher costs to obtain complementary knowledge across country 
borders, if not altogether impossible.  
From this perspective, the nature of knowledge creation and diffusion presents an 
opportunity for multinationals to overcome the weak institutional environment in the host 
country.  On one hand, the internal complementarity of technologies makes the leakage 
of individual components less threatening.  On the other hand, the constraints on cross-
border knowledge flows keep the critical knowledge under the protection of home 
institutions.  The combination of these two makes R&D in weak IPR countries a feasible 
strategy.  I will elaborate this idea in the following two-country two-projects model. 
3.2  The Model Setup 
To focus on the organization of R&D activities, the model assumes away other factors 
that may affect the generation and appropriation of intellectual properties.  For instance, 
large multinational firms, with their worldwide production and marketing networks, are 
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in a better position to use new technologies in a large scale and a broad scope (Cohen and 
Klepper 1996).  They may also enjoy increasing returns to scale in innovation and at the 
same time face less financial constraint.  These factors are left out of the model.  Also for 
simplicity, I assume Bertrand competition among identical products, although the 
framework applies to more general settings.  
Suppose that firm A has two complementary technologies under management: a1 and a2.  
Each technology ai (i = 1, 2) has stand-alone value V(ai).  For example, Sharp 
Corporation’s recent innovation, the Continuous Grain Silicon (CG-Silicon) technology, 
provides higher resolution and brightness to compact LCDs.  Hence, this technology by 
itself has value V(ai), which can be considered the rent that Sharp is able to collect from 
LCD manufacturers.  Once imitation occurs, Sharp would lose its pricing power on this 
technology and V(ai) would plummet to zero.   
At the same time, a1 can also be integrated with a2 as complementary technologies inside 
the firm.  When Sharp combines the CG-Silicon technology with its leading strength in 
TFT-LCD, it creates the “smart” displays that make possible a new generation of feature-
rich portable devices such as Sharp’s Viewcam® digital camcorders and Zaurus® PDAs.   
The joint value of two complementary technologies V(a1 + a2), or V(A), is different from 
the simple sum of individuals V(a1) + V(a2).  Let 
)(
)()(
21
21
aaV
aVaV
+
+=δ  
I argue that δ is less than one for two reasons:  First, technologies developed in one firm 
may not be readily applicable to other firms who possess a different set of resources.  So 
the stand-alone value V(ai) can be small due to implementation difficulties.  Second, the 
innovating firm is in a better position to identify and promote synergy from the pool of 
internal technologies, hence enhancing the value beyond the simple sum of individual 
components.  In the following analysis I will use the phrase “internalized value” to 
generally describe the difference between the joint value V(a1 + a2) and the external value 
V(a1) + V(a2).   
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Note that this is a very general framework.   Internal complementarity – hence higher 
internalized value – does not have to involve a tangible integration process of concrete 
technologies.  It may well arise from the corporate culture, routines, or organizational 
structure that make a technology more valuable internally than if used by other market 
players.  Let δ1 = V(a1) /V(A) and δ2 = V(a2) /V(A), then δ1 +  δ2 = δ < 1.  Note that even 
within the same firm, the degree of internal dependence may vary across different types 
of knowledge (δ1 ≠ δ2).   
Depending on the legal and social institutions, there is certain imitation risk p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) 
in the economy, which is taken as given by individual firms.  With probability p, 
imitation would happen to technology ai and the stand-alone value V(ai) would be taken 
away from the firm.  This is independent of what might happen to the other technology.  
Only when a1 and a2 are both imitated will firm A lose the whole value V(A).2  
An illustration of this scenario is Dupont’s entry into the biotech field.  The goal is to 
integrate biology with Dupont’s current strengths and bring the production to a higher 
level.  As Tom Connelly, Dupont’s senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer 
put it, “new opportunities are going to come at the interfaces… For us, Integrated Science 
means … bringing on that additional capability and then looking for opportunities where 
more than one science comes together.”  Sorona®, the latest addition to the polymer 
platform, is a successful integration of new biological capabilities with Dupont polymer.   
In this example, a1 is the 3GT polymer with many desirable attributes, and a2 is the 
biotech method to produce fiber-grade element for the polymer.  Even if a1 is imitated, 
Dupont can still stay competitive because, so far, the biotech method a2 is the only 
commercially viable way to produce a1.  The same is true if only a2 is imitated.  With the 
proprietary 3GT polymer that a2 is designed for, a2 is much more valuable to Dupont than 
to any other firms.   
                                                 
2  Even if both technologies are imitated, it is still uncertain whether the imitator can perfectly replicate the 
integration process.  The development of these technologies involves intensive interaction with each 
other and with the firm’s existing expertise, so the synergy is not readily transferable.  This factor is 
abstracted from the model to make the main theme more traceable.  Further analysis shows that although 
partial replication can be interesting of its own, omitting it from the model does not change the results. 
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On the cost side, each project incurs R&D expense C(ai).  Think of C(ai) as the payment 
to scientists and engineers who charge market price c for their human capital.  The 
prevailing market price c is determined by the expected returns from innovation in the 
economy: the higher the imitation risk p, the smaller is the value appropriable by the 
innovators, and thus the lower is the price of human capital.  For individual firms, c is 
taken as exogenous.  Firms will invest in R&D if and only if the appropriable value is 
higher than the costs.   
3.3  Multinational R&D 
In essence, there are two boundaries in multinational R&D: the firm boundary and the 
national boundary.  Within a firm boundary, complementary technologies create synergy 
in a way that is hard to duplicate outside the firm.  Within a national boundary, R&D 
activities are subject to certain institutional environment that is distinct from that of other 
countries.  Multinationals are of particular interest because they expand their firm 
boundaries across multiple institutions, and create value from technologies that are 
exposed to different external environments. 
Suppose there are two countries.  Country X has strong IPR protection (small px), hence 
high price of human capital (large cx); country Y is just the opposite: large py and small cy.  
Firm A can choose where to develop its two complementary projects.  It can follow one 
of the following three strategies, 3 as shown in Figure 1: 
- Having both projects developed in country X; 
- Having both projects developed in country Y; 
- Having one project developed in country X and the other in country Y. 
As specified above, the cost of developing technology ai in country j (j = x or y) is the 
amount of human capital used (Hi), times the market price for human capital (cj).   
                                                 
3  Even within one country, firms can choose different organizational structures for their R&D, which in 
turn depend on the external environment.  For example, R&D by small startups is common in the US, 
whereas large and diversified business groups dominate the R&D arena in many Asian countries.   These 
organizational variances are assumed away in this model so as to highlight the cross-institutional 
implications; they will be studied in depth in my future work. 
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In addition, cross border R&D incurs extra coordination and communications costs R 
(Kuemmerle, 1997), which is decreasing in the firm’s organizational capability.  Let R = 
rV(A), where r reflects the organizational cost of the firm, or organizational inefficiency.  
Since V(A) is the value – not only the size – of the projects, an implicit assumption here is 
that higher synergy would also require higher coordination costs. 
 
Figure 1. Organizational Strategies of R&D Projects 
 
The expected income from different R&D strategies depends on the value creation as 
well as the ability to appropriate the created value.  As an example, the following table 
shows the risk profile of strategy (iii), in which a1 is developed in country X and a2 is 
developed in country Y: 
Probability Value loss Comments 
(1- px) (1- py) 0 No imitation 
 px (1- py) V(a1) Losing the stand-alone value of a1 
(1- px) py V(a2) Losing the stand-alone value of a2 
px py V(A) Losing the joint value  
 
So the expected appropriable value is: 
V = V(A) – pxV(a1) – pyV(a2) – px py (1– δ) V(A)  
Intuitively, V is the created value V(A) minus the expected loss of stand-alone values and 
–– if both technologies are imitated –– the internalized value.  Throughout this model I 
National 
boundary 
Country X                             Country Y
Firm 
boundary (i) (ii)
(iii)
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assume risk neutral decision-making, which is purely for the purpose of simplification.  
Taking risk averse into consideration will not qualitatively change the analysis. 
Combining V with the total cost  
C = C(a1) + C(a2) + R 
we get the expected profits  
π = V – C 
The following table presents the expected profits of all three strategies, equally scaled by 
the joint value V(A). 
# Strategy Return 
(i) Both in country X π(i) = 1 – px δ  – px 2 (1– δ ) – (h1 + h2) cx 
(ii) Both in country Y π(ii) = 1 – py  δ  – py 2 (1– δ ) – (h1 + h2) cy 
(iii) Each in one country π(iii) = 1 – px  δ1 – py  δ2  – px py (1– δ) – h1 cx – h2 cy  – r 
 
Here hi = Hi /V(A): the amount of human capital for each unit of value created.  Because 
human capital can be measured in arbitrary units, I normalize h1 + h2 to 1 in the following 
analysis. 
3.4  Internalization-Arbitrage 
Now we are ready to analyze the potential arbitrage opportunities in strategy (iii), 
compared with purely domestic plays (i) and (ii).   In strategy (iii), the two 
complementary components are developed in two different environments with a 
institutional gap ∆p ≡ py – px > 0.  The model will show that, given the difference in 
factor prices ∆c ≡ cx – cy > 0,4 firms with the right internal capabilities are able to gain 
from the cross-border R&D arrangement. 
First, why would firm A in country X have the incentive to go abroad and develop a 
project in country Y?  Take the difference between (iii) and (i):  
                                                 
4  Theoretically, the gap in factor prices will be endogenously affected by firm’s cost arbitrage activities.  
But this is beyond the scope of this paper, and should not be consequential unless we are looking into the 
very long run.  The general equilibrium case will be analyzed in another chapter of my dissertation.  
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iiii −∆⋅+ ∆⋅−+−=− 31444 3444 21 δδππ                                        (a) 
In this equation, part (1) is the extra loss due to the additional imitation risk ∆p.  It 
consists of the potential loss of stand-alone value δ2 as well as the loss of internalized 
value (1– δ ).  What is intriguing here is that, given ∆p, the loss of internalized value is 
reduced if the home country has very strong IPR protection (small px).  The reason is that 
(1 – δ ) stays within the firm as long as either of the two technologies remains exclusive.  
Hence, a strong home institution is critical to the protection of the internalized value.  
The interaction between firms and institutions comes into play in the presence of strong 
technology complementarity within multinational firms. 
Compensating for the extra risks, part (2) is the gain from the inexpensive human capital 
in country Y.  The cost savings are large if the project developed there needs a large 
amount of human capital.  Of course, cross-border R&D arrangement incurs the extra 
coordination cost r, which has to be justified by the advantage derived from (2) – (1).   
Second, why wouldn’t firm A conduct all the R&D in the low cost country?  Take the 
difference between (iii) and (ii):  
( )[ ] {
)3()2(
1
)1(
1
)()( 1 rchppy
iiiii −∆⋅ −  ∆⋅ −+=− 321444 3444 21 δδππ                                        (b) 
The intuitions behind (b) are similar to those behind (a).  Part (1) is the gain from strong 
IPR protection in the home country.  Since a1 is developed in country X, the stand-alone 
value δ1 is better protected and the internalized value (1 – δ ) is also subject to smaller 
imitation risks.  The worse the IPR protection in the host country (large py), the more 
advantageous it is to be multinational.  For purely domestic firms in country Y, even the 
internalized value is hard to protect because both complementary components are subject 
to the same weak IPR. 
However, having a1 developed in country X also means higher cost of human capital.  
Part (2) reflects the cost disadvantage compared with purely domestic firms in country Y.  
The extra coordination cost r may also undo the gains from (1) – (2), and therefore 
discourage cross-border R&D.  
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Equations (a) and (b) explicitly point out the potential arbitrage opportunities in 
multinational R&D activities.  The cross-border arrangement would be a desirable choice 
if π(iii) > π(ii) and π(iii) > π(i) hold simultaneously, i.e., 
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Given ∆p and ∆c, (a’) and (b’) can hold simultaneously if: 
(1) The project developed in country Y takes a large amount of human capital h2 so that 
the cost savings are large, but it has limited stand-alone value δ2 so that the potential 
risks are small.  Meanwhile, the project developed in country X has a high stand-alone 
value δ1, but it requires relatively small amount of human capital h1.   
(2) The imitation risk px is low so that having one project developed in country Y brings 
little damage to the internalized value (1 – δ).  Meanwhile, the imitation risk py is 
high so that keeping one project in country X is critical to the protection of (1 – δ).   
(3) The organizational cost r is reasonably low.   
The three components are not mutually independent.  For example, the organizational 
cost affects the R&D structure endogenously chosen by the firm, and the feature of 
individual components affect the overall degree of internalization.  However, the model 
provides me a logically traceable framework to examine the original puzzle.  Essentially, 
firms can strategically use their internal organizations to arbitrage the institutional gap 
across countries, which I call the internalization-arbitrage mechanism. 
3.5  Insights from the Model 
We were faced with a puzzle: why do multinationals conduct R&D in countries with 
weak IPR protection?  The answer involves an opportunity, and the ability to catch the 
opportunity. 
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Due to the poor IPR protection in some countries, local talents cannot realize value from 
their innovative activities.  Human capital is underpriced as a result.  Such low cost 
human capital is attractive to R&D intensive firms if they possess alternative mechanisms 
to protect their intellectual property.  One of the mechanisms, as identified above, is the 
internal complementarity of technologies.   
First, R&D projects that are heavily reliant on internal complementarities are less 
appealing to imitators.  This enables firms to conduct R&D in weak IPR countries 
without exposing themselves to too much risk.  For example, software module 
development in India and product-based technical solutions in China are very human 
capital intensive, but the value of these technologies is highly dependent on the 
multinationals’ internal R&D architectures.  In contrast, projects developed in the home 
country, such as system designs or core products, tend to be more valuable on their own.  
The strategy of differentiated project assignment, in essence, is to tailor the projects so 
that the firm can capitalize on the strengths of particular locations while minimizing the 
costs or risks.   
Exercising this strategy, however, is not as straightforward as it seems.  Depending on the 
technology field and the firm’s organizational structure, it can be a challenge to carve out 
the right projects for weak IPR countries.  Usually in the IT industry, R&D projects are 
easier to decompose than in the traditional industries, where the lack of a comprehensive 
knowledge base in the host country would significantly affect R&D efficiency and thus 
compromise the cost savings.   
Second, multinationals, by keeping the key components under a strong IPR regime, are in 
a unique position to protect the internalized value arising from internal 
complementarities.  The tighter their internal knowledge structures are, the more 
advantage they have compared with purely domestic firms in the host country. 
The multilingual technology on computer systems is a good example of the internalized 
value.  Because of the non-alphabetical nature of Chinese characters, Chinese software 
companies have been developing multilingual editors and related products since the early 
1980s.  They failed one after another due to prevailing piracies.  At the same time, 
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Microsoft, IBM, and Intel are actively developing multilingual technologies in China.  
The resulting achievements have significantly increased the international appeal of their 
products ranging from office applications to communication devices; the value-added is 
evidenced by their ever-increasing investment in this field.   
In this example, the value appropriation is not reliant on the small stand-alone value of 
specific components.  Most local firms realize the value of multilingual technologies and 
are able to integrate the technologies in their own products.  What makes the difference is 
the inimitable component in the joint value: Intel chips, IBM business solutions, and 
Microsoft software packages marketed in the strong IPR countries.  While local firms 
have to face prevailing piracy and slim profit for their products, multinationals can realize 
the value of these innovations in the global market, where intellectual products are well 
protected and rewarded.   
The example shows that internal complementarity can take on very general forms.  The 
complementary component can be a technology, a firm-specific expertise, or simply the 
access to IPR-friendly markets.  Firms can appropriate the value from R&D as long as the 
complementary components are not subject to the same high risks. 
Of course, only those with sufficient organizational capabilities will find it worthwhile to 
set up R&D facilities in a foreign country, not to mention a country with very different 
institutional environment.  The organizational capabilities can differ widely across firms, 
depending on the firms’ previous exposure to institutional idiosyncrasies, their 
experience in utilizing foreign technologies and resources, and the established routines of 
intra-firm knowledge transfers. 
 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
 
The interviews and anecdotal stories are supportive of the internalization-arbitrage 
conjecture, but they are silent on how general the phenomenon is.  In this step I bring the 
ideas to the data and construct empirical measures to capture the theoretical concepts.   
Doing R&D in Countries with Weak IPR Protection     17 
 
4.1  Implications of Internalization-Arbitrage 
The key insight that emerges from the qualitative analysis is the substitution of firm’s 
internal capabilities for the poor external environment.  A multinational firm can take 
advantage of the inexpensive human capital in weak IPR countries if the value of the 
technologies can only be appropriated inside the firm, and if the firm can efficiently 
coordinate cross-border R&D activities.   
Let γk be the measure of internal linkages for technology k, which is owned by firm i and 
developed in country j.  According to the internalization-arbitrage conjecture, γk should 
depend on (1) the external IPR environment under which k is developed, (2) the 
characteristics of the firm that develops the technology.  Within each firm, γk is expected 
to be higher if k is developed in a country with weak IPR protection.  Across firms, firms 
that are able to conduct R&D in weak IPR countries are expected to have a higher γk for 
all the technologies they develop, everything else being equal.  This lends a natural 
framework to the empirical analysis. 
First, I focus on firms that conduct R&D in countries with weak IPR protection and 
examine the strategies they use: how do firms arbitrage?  If firms strategically allocate 
their R&D projects in response to the external environment, as suggested by the 
theoretical analysis, then we should be able to observe systematic differences among 
technologies developed under different IPR regimes.  Specifically, technologies 
developed in weak IPR countries should have stronger internal linkages, controlling for 
firm characteristics. 
Second, I compare across firms and examine firm capabilities: who are doing the 
arbitrage?  Internalization-arbitrage is a viable strategy only for firms with the right 
internal capabilities to defy the adverse environment in the host countries.  Hence, we 
should be able to observe systematic differences between firms that do R&D in weak IPR 
countries and those that stay away.  Specifically, firms who are able to do so should 
feature tighter organization of their innovative activities and more efficient coordination 
across countries. 
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These tests entail the following tasks:  
 Define “weak IPR countries” using a series of widely cited indices; 
 Describe the data sources and the sample; 
 Construct variables from sample data to capture the theoretical concepts; 
 Identify the right econometric model for the empirical analysis. 
I will address the four tasks in detail in the next four subsections.  
4.2  Defining Weak IPR Countries 
Arbitrage opportunities exist when a country has a substantial reserve of human capital, 
yet suffers from weak IPR protection.  Referring to the World Development Indicators, I 
remove countries and areas that have less than two million population, less than 1% of 
gross tertiary school enrollment rate, or less than five patents filed with USPTO in the 
whole 1990s.  The removed countries and areas are, for example, Belize, Trinidad, and 
most sub-Sahara African countries.  The reason for the screening is that the small size of 
human capital reserves will not justify the entry cost of multinationals.  Although a 
handful of inventors do reside in these countries, they are very likely to represent extreme 
cases.  Including these data may cause biases rather than adding explanatory powers.  For 
the same reason, I remove war-torn countries such as Croatia, Cuba, and Yugoslavia.  
Six indices are considered to measure the institutional environment for IPR protection; 
they reflect different aspects of institutional environment and have been widely used in 
literature.  The time horizons covered by these indices do not exactly coincide with each 
other.  But given the slow changes in institutions, these indices should be indicative of 
the IPR protection levels in these countries. 
The first three indices apply to the general legal and political environment: 
 The Law and Order index in the ICRG Risk Rating System (1993-97).  The index is 
formed using public sources such as newspaper reports published in the country in 
question, national and international news services, reports of national, regional and 
trans-regional banks and other institutions, and international organizations such as 
OECD, BIS, IMF, and the World Bank.   
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 The O-Factor in the PricewaterhouseCoopers Opacity Survey (2000).  Opacity is “the 
lack of clear, accurate, formal, easily discernible, and widely accepted practices.”  The 
potential for opacity exists in five principal areas: corruption in government, the laws 
governing contracts or property rights, economic policies, accounting standards, and 
business regulations.  A high degree of opacity in any of these categories will expose 
the appropriable value of R&D to higher risks. 
 The Property Protection index in the Index of Economic Freedom (1995) by the 
Heritage Foundation.  It mainly tracks seven aspects of property rights protection: the 
commercial code defining contracts, sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract 
disputes, government expropriation of property, corruption within the judiciary, delays 
in receiving judicial decisions, and legally granted and protected private property. 
The second set of indices apply specifically to intellectual property rights protection: 
 Rapp and Rozek (1990) index:  This index reflects the conformity of national patent 
laws with the minimum standards proposed by the United States Chamber of 
Commerce.  It covers about 97 countries, and pertains to the situation in the mid-80s.  
Out-of-date as it is, researchers and businesses are still using it as a reference to gauge 
the IPR environment of the host countries. 
 Ginarte and Park (1997) index:  This frequently cited index was produced for five-year 
intervals starting with 1960 and ending in 1995.  I use the data covering the most recent 
period: 1990-95.  The index rates the national patent protection system according to 
five categories: the extent of coverage, membership in international treaties, provisions 
for loss of protection, enforcement mechanism, and duration of protection.   
 United States Trade Representative’s Special 301 watch list and priority watch list 
(1999).  On the lists are “trading partners that deny adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property or deny fair and equitable market access to United States artists 
and industries that rely upon intellectual property protection.”  Although these lists may 
be biased for political reasons, it is relevant to this study because I am studying the 
behaviors of American firms, who would probably refer to the government 
announcements before making their investment decisions. 
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I also supplement the indices with the Political Constraints measure developed by the 
Rule of Law index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999, 2002), and 
the piracy index developed by the International Planning and Research Corporation (IRC) 
on behalf of the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the Software & Information 
Industrial Association (SIIA). 
These indices turn out to be quite consistent.  Whether I use each single index, or a 
composite index with various weights, I get a very stable list of 34 countries with weak 
IPR protection.  The country names and the corresponding indices are listed in Table 1A 
in the Appendix.  Interestingly, this list is not restricted to low-income regions.  The per 
capita Gross National Income ranges from US$25,920 for Hong Kong (China) to US$440 
for Pakistan in 2000, according to the World Bank statistics.   
4.3  Data 
Despite the various criticisms on patent data, I choose to use the US patent data for the 
following reasons (in addition to Griliches 1990; Patel and Pavitt 1995):  
First, to meet the criteria for patenting, a technology has to be novel, non-obvious, and 
useful.  Multinationals would only file US patents for frontier technologies that have 
potential value in the home country.  With patent data instead of R&D expenditures, I can 
eliminate the localization/adaptation type of R&D specific to the host countries, and 
instead focus on overseas innovations that can bring value to the whole firm – the home 
base augmentation kind of R&D as defined in Kuemmerle (1999).   Moreover, because 
patents are the output of R&D, I can capture the projects that fruitfully utilize human 
capital in the weak IPR countries. 
Second, patent citation is so far the most traceable evidence of knowledge flows (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Fogarty 2000).  The systematic documentation of patent citations tracks 
the knowledge flows within and across the firms’ global innovation networks.  From 
forward patent citations, I can identify who are following up the innovations, when, and 
where.   
Doing R&D in Countries with Weak IPR Protection     21 
 
Finally, the detailed location information for all the patent inventors can help me identify 
the geographic distribution of talents utilized by American firms.  Since the inventors’ 
mailing addresses (not permanent addresses) are required in the patent application, they 
should reliably reflect the actual locations of the innovations.   
Information on patents granted between January 1993 and December 1999 is obtained 
from the NBER patent data.  Patents granted between 2000 and August 2003 are 
analyzed using the weekly Grant Red Book V2.5 bibliographic data from USPTO.  Each 
entry field is closely examined to ensure consistency when the two data sets are merged. 
Admittedly, the usual caveats apply: not all innovations obtain patents, and not all 
knowledge flows are reflected in patent citations.  Casual observations suggest that most 
R&D results in weak IPR countries are not patentable.  In addition, a significant 
proportion of citations are imposed by patent examiners rather than by the applicants 
themselves.  It would be unlikely that those imposed citations represent learning.  I will 
analyze these problems in depth in the robustness check.  
Since patents may be assigned to subsidiaries or parent companies for unobservable 
reasons, I study each multi-unit firm as an integrated strategic agent.  The Directory of 
Corporate Affiliation (DCA) database published by Lexis-Nexis traces corporate linkages 
of more than 174,000 parent companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, and divisions worldwide.  
It allows me to build family trees for each firm in my sample.  By an American firm I 
mean an ultimate parent registered in the United States, plus all its subsidiaries and 
affiliates, home or abroad, that are owned by the same ultimate parent, directly or 
indirectly, by more than 10%.5  After aggregation, the number of firms in my sample is 
only half of the number of assignees. 
Compustat data are used to capture other firm level information, such as industry 
classification, size, etc.  To avoid noises from small or instable firms, I drop companies 
with less than $0.1 million assets, as well as those that are active for less than three years.   
                                                 
5  This is the official criterion of FDI for US companies. I will vary this number in the robustness check and 
make sure that the ownership threshold does not affect the result.  
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It is true that using Compustat data limits the study to the publicly traded companies, but 
it also eliminates the incomparability issue between public and private firms, as these two 
types of firms are subject to very different operational constraints.  Given the fact public 
firms hold the majority of US patents (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001), they should be 
representative of the innovating firms.   
4.4  The Sample 
I decide to focus on US-headquartered firms in the empirical study.  The reason is that I 
can obtain the most complete data for US firms, and at the same time avoid the potential 
administrative biases in cross-country comparisons.   
The sample period is from 1993 to 2001, and I study all the patents that are applied 
during this period (granted up to August 2003).  The reason why I do not include more 
recent years is that there is a typical 2-year time lag between patent application and patent 
granting.  Using the most recently applied patents will bias the sample toward the 
selection of “quick patents”.  At the same time, R&D in weak IPR countries is still a very 
recent phenomenon.  Extending the sample period further back will not add much value 
to the analysis either.  As robustness check, I also examine this sub-period from 1993 to 
1997 in order to stay away from the irrational expansion during the Internet Bubble. 
Different industries vary widely in their propensity to patent and the usefulness of patents 
as the indication of innovative activities (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000).  The industry 
control variables can only partly alleviate the problem.  To reduce unrelated noises, I 
eliminate the industries where patents are very weak indicator of innovations until very 
recent years (e.g., insurance), industries that are heavily influenced by public policies 
(e.g., utility), industries that are domestic by nature (e.g., retailing), or industries whose 
geographic locations are dictated by some exogenous effects (e.g., mining).   The main 
sample includes the following 2-digit SIC industries: 28 (chemical and allied products), 
29 (petroleum and coal products), 30-39 (manufacturing), 48 (communications), 73 
(business services, including software), and 87 (engineering and management services).  I 
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shall vary the industry selection in the robustness check and make sure that our findings 
do not depend on specific industries. 
The challenge in the data preparation is to match the major datasets together, where the 
only link among them is the company names.  A computer program6 is developed to 
match the records together by company names.  I decide not to use the Compustat match 
offered in the NBER patent data, which uses 1989 Compustat data.  Instead, matching is 
conducted year by year to accommodate possible name changes –– which are not unusual 
during this period.  The program has been carefully tested and all the results are manually 
checked.  Any ambiguous matches are verified using information from Dun & Bradstreet, 
company websites, as well as industry publications. 
Patents assignees are first matched with the companies in the DCA file.  Then the patent 
information is aggregated at the ultimate parent level according to the affiliation 
information from DCA.  Accordingly, annual financial data for the American parents are 
obtained from the Compustat files and then matched with the consolidated patent files.  
When mapping multiple years together, I carefully checked the possible changes in 
company names, database coding, mergers and acquisitions, etc., to ensure consistency. 
I drop those companies that have zero patent output during the entire sample period and 
those 3-digit SIC industries that contain less than three innovating firms.  After data 
cleaning, the main sample contains 1567 firms in 92 three-digit SIC industries, whose 
patent output during the eight-year period ranges from one to over twenty thousand 
(IBM), averaging at more than one hundred per firm.  Among these firms, 681 firms 
register positive utilization of foreign inventors while only 227 of them use inventors 
from weak IPR countries.   
From the data sources I can construct a rich set of variables for the empirical analysis.  
The key variables include the geographic distribution of a firm’s innovations, and the 
internal linkages among those innovations. 
                                                 
6 I thank Wilbur Chung for his help with the program. 
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4.5  Locations of Innovation 
Empirical studies often take the country of the first author as the location of an invention, 
partly because this information is readily available in the NBER patent data.  However, 
given my focus on human capital utilization, I want to be very careful about the possible 
distortion.  In a patent with multiple inventors, which is often the case in cross-border 
R&D projects, an inventor from a developing country is likely to be the second, third, or 
15th coauthor in the sequence.  The first authors’ location may therefore bias against the 
involvement of foreign inventors, particularly those from developing countries.  
To verify the possible bias, I track the addresses of all the inventors whose names are 
listed on the patent applications, and weigh the contribution of each inventor by his/her 
sequence in the inventor list7.  Then, for every patent, I calculate the percentage 
contribution from different countries.  Comparison between the first-author rule and the 
weighted-contribution rule confirms my thought that inventors in weak IPR countries are 
more likely to be collaborating with inventors from other countries, and they are more 
likely be at the tail of the inventor sequences.   
In the following analysis,  
 If more than half of the inventors are from weak IPR countries, then the patent is 
considered to be developed in weak IPR countries; 
 If more than half of the inventors are from the US, then this patent is considered to be 
developed in the home country; and 
 The rest are technologies developed in other (strong IPR) foreign countries.   
The 236,850 patents in the full sample are described in Table 1.  Small as it is, the share 
of patents developed by American firms in weak IPR countries has been steadily 
increasing over the last decade.  
Accordingly, a firm is considered to have R&D in weak IPR countries if at least one of its 
patents is developed in those countries.  The firm is considered to have foreign R&D if at 
least one of its patents is developed in a foreign country.  I will vary the classification 
                                                 
7  There are no absolute rules as to the weighting.  Basically, the weight is higher for inventors listed at the 
beginning of the sequence, and higher for inventors in a smaller team.   
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criteria to check the robustness of my results.  Table 2 gives a glance to the 1567 firms 
included in the sample. 
4.6  Internal Linkages 
There is no direct measure for internalized value, but value can be proxied by usage.  
Technologies whose values are highly dependent on other internal resources are more 
likely to be utilized within the firm boundaries.  Since “citations to patents that belong to 
the same firm” represent mostly internalized knowledge transfers (Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg 2001), I will use self-citations to proxy for the internalized value of each 
technology.  Presumably, the more a patent is cited by the same firm (forward self 
citations), the more its value is being retained inside the firm boundary.   
Note that my measure of “self-citation” differs from that of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(2001) in two important aspects, which lead to higher self-citation ratios in this study:   
First, HJT uses the patent assignee code as their unit of analysis.  They acknowledge that 
“the same firm may appear in different patent documents under various, slightly different 
names”, hence assuming different assignee codes.  For example, “Dell USA Corporation” 
and “Dell USA, L.P.” were treated as two different firms.  To avoid this problem, the 
assignees in my sample are all matched to the DCA data of the corresponding year to 
make sure that every firm is unique and identifiable.   
Second, HJT treats every assignee as an independent entity.  Affiliates or subsidiaries of 
the same firm will be given their own assignee codes and hence will show up as unrelated 
with the parent company or with one another.  Because I am more interested in the firm 
as an integrated organization, any citation that occurs within the same firm boundary is 
considered a self-citation.  For example, a citation from IBM Japan, Ltd. to a patent 
owned by the IBM in New York State would be counted as self-citation in this study, but 
would not be the case in HJT. 
Similar to HJT, my citation calculation is subject to the truncation problem in the time 
series.  The patents filed within the 1993-2001 sample period had only received a fraction 
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of the citations by the end of August 2003.  However, I believe that this problem will not 
significantly affect my results, as patents in the same firm are likely to be affected 
similarly and I will certainly control for the between-group variations in my analysis.  
Even if there are significant within-group variations in citation lags, my measure will 
only favor those technologies that are cited by the same-firm patents faster.  This is 
consistent with my objective to capture the efficiency in internal knowledge utilization: 
speed as well as scale. 
   
 
V.  MODEL AND RESULTS  
 
So far I have obtained a rich set of variables to capture the theoretical concepts in the 
model.  In this section I seek empirical support for the internalization-arbitrage conjecture 
by analyzing the within- and across-firm variations in technology structures. 
5.1  Econometric Model 
Let Nk be the number of citations received by technology k, among which nk are self-
citations.  nk, which proxies for internal linkages and falls within the interval [0, Nk], 
depends on (1) the external IPR environment, (2) the internal firm characteristics.   
I choose the zero-inflated negative binomial model to reflect three features of the data: 
First, most patents only received a small number of citations during the short sample 
period.  A continuous measure such as self-citation ratio would be hard to justify where a 
large proportion of the observations are 0’s and 1’s.  Second, negative binomial is 
preferred to a simple Poisson model due to the large variance in the number of received 
citations.  Third, zero self-citations may arise from a different mechanism.  Because 
many patents have yet to receive any citations till the end of the sample period, nk = 0 
does not necessarily mean a low level of internalization.  It may simply be constrained by 
the fact that Nk = 0. 
In the first step, I control for firm effect and study the within-firm variance.  The 
regression takes the following form: 
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 Pr(nk) = f (weak, foreign, i.firm) 
  with inflate (Nk) exposure (Nk) cluster (nclass) 
where  
 weak is the dummy variable to indicate whether the technology is developed in a 
weak IPR country. 
 foreign is the dummy variable to indicate whether the technology is developed in a 
foreign country.  Hence, foreign must be 1 if weak = 1. 
 i.firm is a series of dummies variables to control for firm fixed effects.   
 inflation (Nk) specifies that the total number of citations Nk may cause the observed 
count nk to be zero.  exposure (Nk) specifies Nk as the maximum scope in which self-
citations nk can be observed for each observation. 
 cluster (nclass) specifies that the observations are independent across patent classes 
but not necessarily within the classes.  A generalized correlation matrix may be 
needed for the regression.   
The coefficient on variable foreign is expected to be negative.  Previous studies have 
found that knowledge diffusion is geographically concentrated in nature (Almeida 1996, 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1998).  Therefore, I expect that the foreign developed patents are 
less intertwined with the parent company’s knowledge base. 
Meanwhile, I expect a positive coefficient on the variable weak.  The purpose of R&D in 
weak IPR countries is to appropriate the inexpensive human capital, and knowledge 
internalization is used as a barrier against imitation.  Hence, the demand for internal 
linkages would be stronger in countries with weak external institutions.   
The strong internal linkages may be due to the fact that firms allocate the intrinsically 
more internalized technologies in weak IPR countries.  Alternatively, the firms may be 
developing similar technologies at multiple locations, but with different organizational 
structures.  Both cases are consistent with the theoretical conjecture.  Although a control 
for technology fields is not necessary from the theoretical perspective, it would be 
interesting to see empirically whether it is the type of technologies that is driving the 
differences. 
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In the second step, I compare across firms and examine whether firms doing R&D in 
weak IPR countries manifest stronger internal linkages.  The regression takes the 
following form: 
Pr(nk) = f (weak, foreign, size, f_weak, f_foreign) 
  with inflate (Nk) exposure (Nk) cluster (nclass) 
where  
 weak and foreign are defined as above.   
 size is the firm’s average assets or sales during the sample period.  Alternatively, I 
also use total number of patents, and the logarithm of these variables, to proxy for 
firm size.  Large firms, presumably, are more likely to see both ends of a citation 
falling within the firm boundary. 
 f _weak and f _foreign are two dummy variables to indicate whether the firm that 
developed patent k has any R&D in weak IPR countries or any foreign countries. 
The reason why the technology-specific variables weak and foreign remain in the 
regression is that R&D locations significantly affect the degree of internalization.  It 
would be hard to compare across firms without controlling for the location differences.  
For example, a patent developed by an American firm in Germany would be hardly 
comparable to a patent developed by an American firm in the US.  By controlling for the 
location effect, I am able to examine whether, among technologies developed under 
similar environment, a firm’s R&D presence in weak IPR countries is associated with 
stronger internalization of its technologies. 
According to the discussion in previous sections, firms need to have strong organizational 
capabilities to successfully implement R&D internalization, even more so for R&D in 
weak IPR countries.  Therefore, I expect positive coefficients on both variables f _weak 
and f _foreign. 
Again, the difference in internal linkages may arise from firms’ heterogeneous 
organizational capabilities.  It may also arise from the particular technology fields that the 
firms are involved in.  I cannot precisely tell these two cases apart, as the technology 
fields may be endogenously chosen by firms with different capabilities.  For the purpose 
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of this study, it is sufficient to identify the relationship between a firm’s internal 
knowledge structure and its multinational R&D strategies. 
In both models, the marginal effect (economic significance) of the variables can be 
calculated as follows: 
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Because the key independent variables are 0-1 dummies, the coefficients can be roughly 
interpreted as the change in self-citation ratio if the dummy changes from 0 to 1.  
5.2  Within Firms: Differentiated Project Assignment  
In this step I look into the 227 firms that conduct R&D in weak IPR countries, and 
compare the technologies developed under different IPR regimes.  Table 3 gives the self-
citation ratios for three groups of patents: those developed in weak IPR countries, those 
developed in strong IPR foreign countries, and those developed in the home country 
(U.S.).  As expected, the first group consistently shows higher self-citation ratios than the 
second, highlighting the effect of external environment. 
The regression results are shown in Table 4.  Column (1) is the base model run on the 
whole sample.  With the truncated data, self-citation ratio is increasing over time because 
inventors tend to cite the same-firm patents faster.   In column (2) I repeat the same 
regression with eight year-dummies to remove the time effect.  Replacing the year-
dummies with a trend variable t generates similar results. 
In column (3), I only include firms that have more than 50 patents over the nine-year 
period.  The purpose is to make sure that the results are not driven by misrepresentative 
observations in small firms.  Since the theoretical conjecture is on firms’ internal 
complementarities, those above certain R&D scales should be the more appropriate group 
to study. 
Statistics show that over half of the US patent citations are imposed by examiners, rather 
than being submitted by inventors or patent attorneys in their patent applications (Alcacer 
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and Gittelman, 2003).8  Although inventors may fail to cite the prior arts for various 
reasons, it would be far-fetched to interpret the examiner-imposed citations as knowledge 
flows.  Luckily, the distinction between inventor-filed and examiner-imposed citations is 
now available for patents granted after 2000.  Therefore in column (4), I conduct the test 
using only inventor-filed citations made by post-2000 patents.   
In the theoretical analysis, I argue that the viability of this strategy may vary widely 
across industries.  When the R&D needs substantial support from the local knowledge 
base, the low wages may be compromised by low efficiencies.  It would be interesting to 
examine whether the internalization-arbitrage conjecture holds not only in aggregate, but 
also in particular technology fields.  Column (5) reports the results for patents in the 
“Computers and Communications” field, as defined by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(2001).  It contains 35 primary US patent classes spanning communications, computer 
hardware & software, computer peripherals, and information storages.  Separate tests are 
also conducted in other categories. 
As shown in Table 4, throughout the specifications the coefficient on the foreign dummy 
is significantly negative, which indicates distance effect.  Marginal effect calculation 
shows that within the same firm, foreign developed patents are 20-30% less likely to be 
cited by the same firm, compared with those developed in the home country.  The 
difference is even larger in the IT industry and pharmaceutical industry.     
However, the positive coefficient on the weak dummy nearly offset all the negative 
distance effect.  This is not trivial if we believe that the weak IPR countries are even 
further away from the home country in terms of culture, institutions, and technological 
development.  The net effect of weak and foreign indicates that technologies developed in 
weak IPR countries are intertwined in the firms’ internal knowledge base as if they were 
right at US headquarters! 
It may be the case that the large proportion of self-citations is not due to firms’ strategic 
project assignment, but to the development level of the host countries.  Generally, the 
weak IPR countries are also the less developed countries.  Innovators in those countries 
                                                 
8  I thank Juan Alcacer and Michelle Gittelman for their help on data preparation. 
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have to rely heavily on the knowledge base of the parent companies and produce very 
firm-specific intellectual properties.  However, this interpretation is still consistent with 
the theoretical argument.  Multinationals provide the knowledge base necessarily to 
develop the new technologies effectively, which cannot be easily obtained otherwise by 
the local talents.  As a result, the generated technologies are less likely to be utilized 
outside of the firm boundaries. 
5.3  Across Firms: Organizational Structure 
In this step I look across firms and examine firm capabilities.  Do firms that conduct 
R&D in weak IPR countries systematically differ from other firms in their internal 
organization?  Table 5 gives the average self-citation ratios for three groups of firms: 
those with positive patent output in weak IPR countries, those with positive patent output 
in foreign (but not weak IPR) countries, and those whose R&D is in the home country 
(U.S.) only.  Statistics for large R&D firms are also shown in the table.  Consistently, 
firms with R&D in weak IPR countries show much higher self-citation ratios on average. 
The regression results are shown in Table 6.  Column (1) and (2) are the base model run 
on the whole sample, with and without time effect.  In column (3), I control for patent 
classes9 to test whether the difference in internal linkages are driven by different 
technology fields that the firms are engaged in.  Same as in the within-firm analysis, 
column (4) removes examiner-imposed citations and focuses on citations received after 
2000, while column (5) gives a glimpse of the results for specific technology fields. 
Across all specifications, the coefficients on f _weak and f _foreign are positive and 
significant.  The results show that firms who are able to conduct R&D overseas generally 
have more internalized technology structures compared with purely domestic firms.  In 
addition, among firms with foreign R&D, those who are able to do R&D in weak IPR 
countries manifest even stronger internal linkages.  The location effects are controlled 
throughout the analysis. 
                                                 
9  The reported result uses the 3-digit US primary patent classes.  Aware of the caveats with this 
classification, I also used the International Patent Classes (IPC) on a sub-sample and obtained 
qualitatively similar results. 
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Arguably, firms with R&D in weak IPR countries have proportionally more self-citations 
simply because they are larger.  Although this is consistent with my theory10, I would like 
to examine more closely whether the degree of internalization is fully explained by firm 
size.  In Table 7 I report the regression results with controls of assets (1), the logarithm of 
assets (2), annual sales (3), and the total number of patents owned by the firm (4).   
Surprisingly, assets and sales both show up with negative coefficients.  That is, among 
firms that do R&D in foreign/weak IPR countries, larger size is associated with even 
weaker internal linkages, although the marginal effect is very small.  Meanwhile, the 
coefficients on f _weak and f _foreign remain positive and significant.  A large patent 
pool does offer some explanation power to the high level of self-citations, but the 
economic significance is, on average, less than 1% of the f _weak and f _foreign dummies.  
Therefore, the data provide supportive evidence that firms with R&D in weak IPR 
countries feature stronger internal linkages, even after controlling for firm sizes. 
 
 
VI.  ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
In this section I discuss the caveats in the above analysis and carry out a series of 
robustness tests to make sure that the results do not depend on the specific setups.  
Bias in Using Patent Data 
Without a direct measure for knowledge creation and knowledge flows, there are 
potential measurement biases in the empirical test: 
 I hope to test whether technologies developed in weak IPR countries are more 
internalized than technologies developed elsewhere.  But instead we can only observe 
whether patents developed in weak IPR countries receive higher self-citations.   
 I hope to test whether firms that do R&D in weak IPR countries have more 
internalized innovation structures.  But instead we can only observe whether firms 
that have patents from weak IPR countries are more internalized.   
                                                 
10 Optimally, firms expand until the organizational costs go beyond the benefit of internalization.  In that 
sense, firm size itself reflects organizational capabilities.   
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With different patent propensity across firms and across countries, I need to examine to 
which extent the unobservable part of the R&D activities would affect my result.  
Firms file patents so that they can “exclude others from making, using, or selling the 
technology in the United States” (USPTO), and claim credit from whoever uses it.  Given 
the nontrivial cost involved in patent applications, firm will only patent a technology if it 
expects potential uses of the technology by other firms.  Moreover, the results of many 
R&D activities, such as program coding and laboratory tests, are not patentable at all.  
These activities also tend to be the most firm specific.  Therefore, the non-patented 
technologies should be more internalized than the patented ones.  As a result, self-citation 
ratios calculated from the patent data would underestimate the overall internal linkages of 
R&D activities. 
Conversations with managers and engineers in the China labs suggest that most R&D 
efforts there are not in the patent-oriented category.  Only a small proportion of the 
technologies with the highest outside value will be patented in the US.  If non-patentable 
R&D is more common in the weak IPR countries – which seems to be the case according 
to observations – then the estimation of internal linkages is biased downward by a larger 
extent in weak IPR countries than in other countries.  If anything, this sample bias goes 
against my findings and should make the results even more significant.  The same logic 
applies to the analysis of firms.   
Biases in Measuring Self-Citations 
Due to the organizational changes over the years, the self-citation counts may be biased 
upward or downward.  For example, after firm A was acquired by firm B, A as a firm no 
longer exists.  As a result, any citation from the post-acquisition firm B to the prior arts 
assigned to A would not be counted as self-citations, even if the citing and cited patents 
may involve exactly the same team of inventors.  On the other hand, if a team in firm A 
worked on a project up to the acquisition date and the resultant patent is assigned to the 
post-acquisition firm B, then citations to the prior arts owned by B would be counted as 
self-citation, although they hardly represent within-firm knowledge flows. 
Doing R&D in Countries with Weak IPR Protection     34 
 
To avoid these biases, I eliminate from the sample any assignees that changed firm 
affiliation during the sample period.  Also eliminated are firms that substantially changed 
their names, although the affiliation numbers remain the same.  This decreased the 
number of firms in my sample to 1054.  
The same within-firm and across-firm regressions are conducted on the reduced sample, 
and the results from the base model are reported in Table 8.  Compared with the base 
model in Table 4 and Table 6, the reduced sample with stable firm affiliations produces 
even stronger within- and across-firm differences.  Controlling for firm effect, 
technologies developed in weak IPR countries are 25% more likely to be cited internally 
than those developed in other foreign countries.  Controlling for R&D locations, firms 
with R&D in weak IPR countries have roughly 43% higher self-citation ratios than firms 
that only engage in R&D in strong IPR countries, and 74% higher than purely domestic 
firms. 
Alternative Measure of Internal Linkages 
There are many aspects of internal linkages for an organization, and the self-citation 
measure is at best an imperfect proxy.  The internalization-arbitrage argument would be 
more convincing the same pattern can be found with alternative measures. 
One measure that has been developed for this purpose is R&D collaboration across 
geographic locations (Lahiri 2003).  Presumably, having researchers from different 
countries collaborate on the same project not only signals the firm’s strong coordination 
capabilities, but also facilitates future knowledge flows within the firm.   
Again, I follow the same procedures of within- and across-firm analysis.   
Suppose in each firm, there are Kc patents involving inventors from a particular country 
c, among which kc are collaborated work with inventors from other countries.  Then the 
ratio kc/Kc captures the linkages between the inventors in the country c subsidiary and 
other parts of the firm.  Focusing on firms with R&D in weak IPR countries, I find that 
on average, 62% of the patents involving inventors from weak IPR countries are 
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collaborated, versus 44% for patents involving inventors from other foreign countries.  
Among patents that are developed at the same location, say, the strong IPR foreign 
countries, the kc/Kc ratio is 44% for firms conducting R&D in weak IPR countries, and is 
37% for firms staying away.   
This calculation, therefore, confirms the thought that technologies developed in weak IPR 
countries feature stronger internal linkages, and that the firms tapping talents in weak IPR 
countries consistently have stronger internal linkages overall. 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS 
 
Doing R&D in countries with weak IPR protection seems contradictory to the 
comparative advantage theory.  Because of the poor institutional environment, these 
countries are not known for their R&D or technology strengths.  This paper argues that 
multinational firms can substitute their internal innovation organizations for the external 
environment.  Firms with closely-knit internal technology structures are able to take 
advantage of the undervalued human capital in these countries without exposing 
themselves to too much risk.  
This adds to our understanding of a fundamental question in international strategy.  
Traditional views focus on firm-specific assets (intangibles, etc.) or location-specific 
endowment (natural resource, etc.) as the driving forces of internationalization.  More 
recently, Ghemawat (2003) advocates that the foundation for international strategy 
should be built on the arbitraging of international differences, strategies made possible by 
internal firm capabilities.  This study is a direct illustration of this point: institutional gaps 
across countries can be an important source of arbitrage opportunities.  The study also 
reveals the internal capabilities required to take advantage of the opportunities.  Just as 
globalization is not for everybody, neither is setting up R&D centers in China or India.  
To benefit from R&D internationalization, a firm’s infrastructure matters. 
While identifying the potential opportunities in adverse institutional environment, I am 
by no means indicating that poor IPR protection is good either for firms or for the 
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economy.  In face of weak legal institutions, firms strategically internalize their 
knowledge-intensive activities.  As a result, even if the quantity of foreign R&D may not 
be significantly affected by patent protection (Kumar 2001), the nature of R&D varies 
widely, as evidenced by this study.  In particular, a multinational firm would only carry 
out specific types of R&D in weak IPR countries, and only firms with strong 
organizational capabilities would choose to do so.  In other words, internalization-
arbitrage is multinational firms’ strategic choice under the constraint of poor external 
environment.  Removing this constraint is expected to alter both the channel and the 
direction of knowledge flows.  For example, multinationals would feel comfortable 
bringing technologies that are more readily applicable to the host countries.  Indeed, 
Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2002) show that U.S. multinational firms responded to 
IPR reforms in the host country with more technology transfers to the subsidiaries.   
For policy makers, this study points out that firms are not passive policy takers.  
Multinational firms can leverage one country’s institutional environment for their 
operations in other countries; and public policies in one country may have spillover 
effects on the effectiveness of other countries’ policies.  The interactions between firm 
strategies and institutional changes have to be analyzed in a global context. 
This study also opens a whole line of further researches.  
First, it would be interesting to take the current analysis to a dynamic setting.  R&D 
internalization and R&D in weak IPR countries have both grown rapidly in the recent 
several years.  What are the fundamental changes that have magnified this arbitrage-
internalization effect?  Are these changes happening in corporate management or in the 
external environment?  Or both?  Or one is the repercussion of the other?  
Second, even among firms that do R&D in weak IPR countries, I have observed a large 
variation in R&D organizations across firms and across industries.  How is this related to 
firm performance?  Is this dependent on the leader/follower positions of individual firms?  
Answering these questions entails in-depth study to disentangle the multiple forces 
underlying the variation.  
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Finally, the arbitrage-internalization mechanism should not be limited to innovation only.  
This thinking – using internal capability to substitute for inadequate social and legal 
institution – can also be found in the mainstream internalization theories (e.g., in Buckley 
and Casson, 1976) and in the line of work on “business groups” (Khanna 2000).  
Although the intangibility of knowledge makes R&D the ideal sector for institutional 
arbitrage, we have reason to believe that the mechanism applies to other sectors too.  A 
study with a boarder view would surely deepen our understanding of firms and 
institutions.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Description of Sample Patents 
 
Patents developed in 
weak IPR countries 
Patents developed in all 
foreign countries 
Year 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Total number of 
patents 
1993 118 0.60% 2,070 10.53% 19,652 
1994 209 0.98% 2,219 10.41% 21,313 
1995 251 0.81% 6,651 21.41% 31,061 
1996 278 0.95% 4,387 14.94% 29,371 
1997 385 1.12% 3,406 9.91% 34,357 
1998 386 1.22% 3,203 10.10% 31,708 
1999 505 1.70% 3,332 11.21% 29,716 
2000 437 1.79% 2,982 12.20% 24,434 
2001 267 1.75% 1,820 11.94% 15,238 
Total 2,836 1.20% 30,070 12.70% 236,850 
 
 
Table 2. Description of the Sample Firms 
 
Firms that do R&D 
Variables in weak IPR 
countries        
(227 obs) 
in any foreign 
countries        
(681 obs) 
All Firms      
(1567 obs) 
Assets (million dollars) 10414.65 4981.98 2687.09 
Sales (million dollars) 8088.27 3813.81 1931.97 
Number of patents 750.14 298.60 137.61 
Number of subsidiaries 45.69 31.99 19.36 
Number of assignees 4.98 3.34 2.27 
Countries with presence 13.56 8.92 4.55 
H-index for tech class 0.08 0.12 0.28 
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Table 3.  Self-Citation Ratios of Patents Developed under Different Environment 
 
Patents developed  in weak 
IPR countries 
Patents developed in other 
foreign countries 
Patents developed in the 
home country Year 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
1993 0.133 0.191 0.129 0.228 0.083 0.198 
1994 0.167 0.252 0.130 0.232 0.076 0.192 
1995 0.187 0.267 0.117 0.231 0.070 0.180 
1996 0.198 0.302 0.109 0.237 0.078 0.215 
1997 0.181 0.295 0.140 0.277 0.101 0.247 
1998 0.189 0.314 0.179 0.330 0.166 0.324 
1999 0.236 0.377 0.216 0.360 0.212 0.357 
2000 0.399 0.472 0.251 0.398 0.365 0.453 
2001 0.686 0.464 0.315 0.449 0.396 0.455 
Average 0.200 0.312 0.164 0.301 0.224 0.324 
 
 
Table 4.  Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression on Within-Firm Difference 
 
 
Without Year 
Dummy 
(1) 
With Year 
Dummy  
(2) 
Firms with >50 
patents  
(3) 
Excluding 
examiners'  
(4) 
Computer & 
Telecom 
(5) 
Weak IPR country  0.2201
***  
(0.0429) 
 0.2055***  
(0.0425) 
 0.2033***  
(0.0426) 
 0.2128***  
(0.0566) 
 0.3941***  
(0.0659) 
Foreign country -0.2851
*** 
(0.0152) 
-0.2838***   
(0.0150) 
-0.2838***  
(0.0151) 
-0.2248***  
(0.0217) 
-0.4496***  
(0.0303) 
Const -1.6529
*** 
(0.0595) 
-1.6743***   
(0.0599) 
-1.6755***   
(0.0600) 
-1.9263***   
(0.1093) 
-0.6564***   
(0.6398) 
Total citation - exposure         
      
Inflate           
Total citation  0.0131
***   
(0.0011) 
 0.01181***  
(0.0012) 
 0.01180***  
(0.0022) 
 0.0883***  
(0.0078) 
 0.0178***  
(0.0022) 
Const -2.4702
*** 
(0.0484) 
-2.4389***  
(0.0497) 
-2.4405***  
(0.0498) 
-2.9442***  
(0.1213) 
-3.2100***  
(0.1309) 
            
Obs 125796 125796 125036 95302 42801
log_likelihood -153830.20 -153479.8 -153106.1 -66659.79 -52536.13
LR chi2  22600.59 23301.52 22799.91 14710.83 7282.7
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 5.  Self-Citation Ratios of Patents Developed by Different Firms 
 
Firms with positive patent output  
in the 10-year period 
Firms with >50 patents  
in the 10-year period 
Year 
w/ R&D in weak 
IPR countries 
w/ R&D in other 
foreign countries
w/o any foreign 
R&D 
w/ R&D in weak 
IPR countries 
w/o R&D in 
weak IPR 
countries 
1993 0.175 0.129 0.083 0.180 0.129 
1994 0.180 0.130 0.076 0.185 0.109 
1995 0.163 0.117 0.070 0.167 0.134 
1996 0.195 0.109 0.078 0.201 0.105 
1997 0.219 0.140 0.101 0.226 0.164 
1998 0.249 0.179 0.166 0.254 0.185 
1999 0.294 0.216 0.212 0.299 0.281 
2000 0.340 0.251 0.365 0.347 0.273 
2001 0.410 0.315 0.396 0.408 0.348 
Average 0.211 0.144 0.125 0.216 0.153 
 
Table 6.  Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression on Cross-Firm Difference 
 
 
Without Year 
Dummy 
(1) 
With Year 
Dummy 
(2) 
Control for 
patent classes
(3) 
Excluding 
examiners' 
(4) 
Computer & 
Telecom 
(5) 
Firm w/ R&D in 
weak IPR 
 0.3991***  
(0.0127) 
 0.3950***  
(0.0125) 
 0.3239***  
(0.0126) 
 0.5337***  
(0.0191) 
 0.5256***  
(0.0249) 
Firms w/ R&D in 
foreign 
 0.2644*** 
(0.0290) 
 0.3196***   
(0.0285) 
 0.3112***  
(0.0284) 
 0.1016**  
(0.0403) 
 0.7188***  
(0.0652) 
Developed in   
weak IPR 
 0.0808*  
(0.0467) 
 0.0390  
(0.0456) 
 0.2002***  
(0.0438) 
 0.0573   
(0.0585) 
 0.4846***  
(0.0683) 
Developed in 
foreign 
-0.4077*** 
(0.0146) 
-0.3811***   
(0.0144) 
-0.4605***  
(0.0143) 
-0.2753***  
(0.0206) 
-0.6570***  
(0.0282) 
Const -2.0770
*** 
(0.0272) 
-2.2373***   
(0.0286) 
-2.5436***   
(0.4744) 
-2.8044***   
(0.0446) 
-3.0136***   
(0.0650) 
Total citation - exposure         
      
inflate           
Total citation  0.0119
***   
(0.0009) 
 0.0102***  
(0.0010) 
 0.0097***  
(0.0009) 
 0.0830***  
(0.0052) 
 0.0145***  
(0.0019) 
Const -2.0326
*** 
(0.0455) 
-2.0344***  
(0.0492) 
-1.9433***  
(0.0409) 
-1.9950***  
(0.0778) 
-2.7041***  
(0.1306) 
      
Obs 153950 153950 153950 116138 49733
log_likelihood -192640.3 -191527.2 -186562.4 -83201.8 -62134.3
LR chi2 2180.04 4406.28 14335.92 5538.83 2044.86
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 7.  Cross-Firm Regression with Size Effect 
 
  
Control for 
Assets         
(1) 
Control for Log 
of Assets      
(2) 
Control for 
Sales          
(3) 
Control for 
Patent Output 
(4) 
Assets ($BN) -0.0020
***  
(0.0001)       
Log_Assets  -0.0219
***  
(0.0034)   
Sales ($BN)   -0.0024
***   
(0.0002)  
Patent Output 
(thousand)    
 0.0120***  
(0.0007) 
Firms w/ R&D 
in weak IPR 
 0.4761*** 
(0.0141) 
 0.2323***  
(0.0165) 
 0.4788***   
(0.0142) 
 0.1095***  
(0.0146) 
Firms w/ R&D 
in foreign 
 0.3415*** 
(0.0326) 
 0.2878***  
(0.0338) 
 0.3422***   
(0.0326) 
 0.2756***  
(0.0302) 
Developed in 
weak IPR 
 0.0340    
(0.0471) 
 0.0672    
(0.0476) 
 0.0410    
(0.0471) 
 0.0980*  
(0.0473) 
Developed in 
foreign 
-0.3655*** 
(0.0154) 
-0.3718***  
(0.0154) 
-0.3686***   
(0.0154) 
-0.4043***  
(0.0151) 
Const -2.2574
*** 
(0.0326) 
-2.9459***   
(0.0902) 
-2.2638***   
(0.0326) 
-3.1274***   
(0.0827) 
Total citation - exposure       
     
inflate         
Total citation  0.0089
***   
(0.0012) 
 0.0107***  
(0.0012) 
 0.0088***  
(0.0012) 
 0.0135***  
(0.0012) 
Const -2.1412
*** 
(0.0326) 
-2.2904***  
(0.0589) 
-2.1321***  
(0.0578) 
-2.5187***  
(0.0696) 
     
Obs 126636 125672 126636 137626
log_likelihood -160355.5 -159688.5 -160369.4 -167770.0
LR chi2 3766.21 3357.86 3738.43 7726.48
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 8.  Within- and Cross-Firm Regression with Stable Firm Affiliations 
 
  Within-firm         (1) 
Across-firm        
(2) 
Firms w/ R&D 
in weak IPR   0.4309
***  (0.0136) 
Firms w/ R&D 
in foreign   0.3115
***  (0.0314) 
Developed in 
weak IPR  0.2543
***   (0.0437)  0.0826*    (0.0471) 
Developed in 
foreign -0.3034
*** (0.0159) -0.4131***  (0.0152) 
Const -1.6456*** (0.1396) -2.2466***   (0.0315) 
Total citation - exposure   
   
inflate     
Total citation 0.0105***   (0.0014) 0.0095***  (0.0012) 
Const -2.5555*** (0.0589) -2.1863***  (0.0610) 
   
Obs 106365 129614 
log_likelihood -130730 -162695.3 
LR chi2 20209.91 3855.15 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
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APPENDIX  A. Countries of Weak IPR Protections 
 
 Scientist 
&Enginee
rs/million 
people 
Population 
(millions) 
Tertiary 
School 
(gross %)
Opacity 
Factor 
2000 
Property 
Rights 
1995 
Law & 
Order 
93-95
Rapp 
and 
Rozek
Ginarte 
& Park 
1990 
USTR's 
Special 
30111 
1999 
KKZ 
Index 
1998
Piracy 
Rate 
2000 
Argentina 711 35.22 41.80 60.60 2 4.58 1 2.26 1.5 0.24 58 
Belarus 2,296 10.30 44.00 3    1.0 -1.08  
Brazil 168 161.52 11.70 60.85 3 3.25 1 1.85 1.0 -0.09 58 
Bulgaria 1,289 8.36 41.20 3     -0.22  
Chile 370 14.42 30.30 35.65 1 4.58 2 2.41 1.0 1.26 49 
China 459 1215.30 5.70 87.16 4  1  2.0 -0.22 94 
Costa Rica 533 3.40 33.10 3  3 1.47 1.0 0.88  
Czech Rep. 1,317 10.32 22.70 70.81 2    1.0 0.62 43 
Egypt 493 59.27 22.60 57.97 4 3.61 2 1.99 1.5 0.17  
Greece 1,045 10.48 42.80 57.38 2 5.56 4 2.32 1.5 0.66 66 
HK, China 93 6.32 28.00 44.68 1 5.36  2.57  1.73 57 
Hungary 1,249 10.19 25.10 50.07 2    1.0 0.78 51 
India 158 945.78 6.90 63.74 3 3.83 1 1.48 1.5 0.21 63 
Indonesia .. 197.18 11.30 75.16 3 4.22 0 0.33 1.5 -0.97 89 
Israel 1,570 5.69 43.60 52.71 2 5.00 5 3.57 1.5 1.09 41 
Korea, Rep. 2,139 45.51 60.30 73.46 1 5.00 3 3.94 1.0 0.82 56 
Lithuania 2,031 3.71 31.40 58.45      0.19  
Malaysia 154 21.14 11.40 2 4.61 3 2.37  0.82 66 
Mexico 213 92.71 16.10 47.64 2 3.00  1.63 1.0 -0.38 56 
Pakistan 78 125.42 3.40 61.96 2 2.64  1.99 1.0 -0.71  
Peru 229 23.95 31.10 57.63 3 2.83 1 1.02 1.5 -0.44 61 
Philippines 156 71.90 35.20 3 3.78 4 2.67 1.0 -0.04 61 
Poland 1,460 38.62 24.30 63.93 3    1.0 0.57 54 
Portugal 1,583 9.93 38.00 2 5.42 3 1.98  1.31 42 
Romania 1,393 22.61 22.50 71.42 4    1.0 -0.25  
Russia 3,397 147.73 41.40 83.59 3    1.5 -0.78 88 
Slovak Rep. 1,706 5.35 22.10 2     0.13  
South Africa 992 39.90 18.80 59.54 3 3.33 5 3.57 1.0 0.21 45 
Spain 1,562 39.27 51.10 2 6.00 4 2.95 1.0 1.35 51 
Taiwan (CN) 660 21.42 18.71 60.64 1 5.00   1.0 1.17 53 
Thailand 102 60.00 20.90 66.95 1 5.00 1 1.85 1.0 0.40 79 
Turkey 303 61.45 18.20 74.07 2 4.17 1 1.80 1.5 0.19 63 
Ukraine 2,121 51.11 41.50 4    1.5 -0.76  
Venezuela 194 22.31 25.40 63.45 3 4.00 2 1.35 1.0 -0.62 58 
United States 4,103 265.23 80.60 35.53 1 6.00 . 4.52 . 1.77 26 
 
                                                 
11 The countries with a “1” are countries on the watch list, those with a “1.5” are on the priority watch list, 
and those with a “2.0” are section 306 monitoring countries. 
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APPENDIX  B.  Illustration of Data Sources 
 
 
COMPUSTAT (1993-2001)       
       – Assets, Sales, R&D, SIC, etc. 
Key: CNUM 
DCA (1993-2001)                
       – Subsidiaries, Foreign Entries, etc. 
Key: NUM 
Listed U.S. firms 
NBER patent data ( granted 1993-1997) 
      Patent –– Assignee – Company name
            Patent Class 
            Backward Citations 
            Forward Citations 
            Inventor Information 
Firm i 
Sub i1 Sub i2 Sub i3 
Patent key #  ↔ Firm key # 
(For Every Application Year 
1993-2001) 
 Self citations  
 IPR environment 
 Technology characteristics
 Firm characteristics USPTO Red Book (granted 1998-2003) 
CONAME CD 
      Patent –– Assignee – Company name
            Patent Class 
            Backward Citations 
            Forward Citations 
            Inventor Information 
Parent i 
Country Indices (various years) 
      IPR Protection  
 Inventor 
cited 
 Examiner 
imposed 
(1)
(2)
(3) 
(4) 
(6)
(5) 
(7) 
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Notes: 
 Dotted rectangular: data sources 
 Rounded rectangular: processed datasets 
 Dashed lines: data matching 
 Solid lines: information reference 
 
Steps 
(1) Match COMPUSTAT with DCA data, year by year, according to company names. 
(2) For each matched firm, extract all the family members from DCA. 
(3) Prepare data for patents applied on or after 1993, and granted between 1993 and 
1997, using the NBER dataset. 
(4) Prepare data for patents applied on or after 1993, and granted between 1998 and 
mid-2003, using the USPTO data.  Assignee names are modified according to the 
USPTO company name files. 
(5) Country indices are used to describe the countries of the inventors. 
(6) Patent assignee names are matched with all the company names –parents as well as 
subsidiaries and other family members –in the COMPUSTAT-DCA company list.  
Thus, every patent (with relevant information) is corresponding to a firm (with 
relevant information).  Inventor locations are used to determine the IPR 
environment in which the technology is developed.  Self-citations are used to proxy 
for internal linkages.  
(7) Among the self-citations from (6), count the number of self-citations imposed by 
the examiner.  Exclude those citations in the robustness check. 
 
 
 
